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I. The Overall Setting 
1. Paper’s Aims 
In this paper, I analyse the conduct of business rules included in the Directive on 
Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID)1 which has replaced the Investment Services 
Directive (ISD).2 These rules, in addition to being part of the regulation of investment 
intermediaries, operate as contractual standards in the relationships between 
intermediaries and their clients. While the need to harmonise similar rules is generally 
acknowledged, in the present paper I ask whether the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture, 
which governs securities law making in the EU, has in some way improved regulation in 
this area. In section II, I examine the general aspects of the Lamfalussy process. In 
section III, I critically analyse the MiFID’s provisions on conduct of business obligations, 
best execution of transactions and client order handling, taking into account the new 
regime of trade internalisation by investment intermediaries and the ensuing competition 
                                               
*Professor of Business Law and Capital Markets Law, University of Genoa. 
 
1 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21  April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1.  
 
2 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, OJ L 141, 
11.6.1993, p. 27. 
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between these intermediaries and market operators.3 In section IV, I draw some general 
conclusions on the re-regulation made under the Lamfalussy regulatory structure and its 
limits. In this section, I make a few preliminary comments on the relevance of conduct of 
business rules to contract law, the ISD rules of conduct and the role of harmonisation. 
2. Relevance to Contract Law 
While the rules of conduct applicable to investment intermediaries belong to 
regulatory law and have public law nature,4 their relevance to contract law is almost 
undisputed.5 First of all, contracts made between investors and intermediaries must 
comply with the conduct of business obligations applicable to the latter under regulatory 
law. For example, under Article 19 (7) MiFID ‘the investment firm shall establish a 
record that includes the document or documents agreed between the firm and the client 
that set out the rights and obligations of the parties, and the other terms on which the firm 
will provide services to the client …’. The Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR), in expressing its advice on possible implementing measures of the MiFID under 
the Lamfalussy procedure, suggested that these measures should cover the minimum 
content of the retail client agreement, including the basic agreement, agreements for 
                                               
3 For a more comprehensive treatment of this issue, see G. Ferrarini and F. Recine, ‘Testing the Lamfalussy 
Regulatory Structure: The MiFID and Internalisation’, paper presented at the Conference on Investor Protection 
and Capital Markets Integration in Europe held at the University of Milan on the 11 -12 November 2004 (the 
conference proceedings are forthcoming). 
 
4 See I. Koller, ‘vor § 31’, in H. D. Assmann and U. Schneider (eds), Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 2nd ed. (Köln: 
Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, 1999), 665, para. 16, who defines those included in Article 11 ISD as purely 
supervisory rules; J. Köndgen, ‘Rules of Conduct: Further Harmonisation?’, in G. Ferrarini (ed), European 
Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond  (London-The Hague-Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), 117, who speaks of ‘transforming duties of contractual or precontractual origin into public -
law obligations’. 
 
5 See M. Tison, ‘Conduct of Business Rules and their Implementation in the EU Member States’, in G. Ferrarini, 
K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the Euro: Cross-border Transactions, Listed 
Companies and Regulation (London-The Hague-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 76, raising the 
question ‘whether the drafters of the [ISD] intended solely to underline the protection of investors as an indirect 
side-effect of the protection offered through the supervision and deontological enforcement of the rules of 
conduct, or whether, on the contrary, the directive effectively envisaged having rules of conduct drawn up by the 
Member States on which investors could directly rely against the investment firm’; and answering the same a s 
follows: ‘In view of the clear wording of the preamble to the ISD, the latter viewpoint must be adhered to’ (the 
preamble referred to by the author states in its 47 th recital concerning the conduct of business rules: ‘Whereas 
one of the objectives of the Treaty is to protect investors’).  
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trading in derivatives and agreements for portfolio management.6 Similarly, the conduct 
of business obligations have an impact on the formation of the client agreement to the 
extent that Article 19 (3) MiFID requires ‘appropriate information’ to be provided to 
clients or potential clients ‘so that they are reasonably able to understand the nature and 
risks of the investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that is 
being offered …’. Also in this respect, CESR suggested detailed implementing measures, 
underlying the different nature of the information to be included in the client agreement 
and the pre-contractual information to be provided under Article 19 (3), and remarking 
that under Article 19 (2) ‘all information …addressed by the investment firm to clients or 
potential clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading’.7 Moreover, conduct of business 
obligations supplement contract terms, such as the ‘suitability’ standard requiring ‘the 
investment firm to assess whether the investment service or product envisaged is 
appropriate for the client’ (see section III, para. 2 below). In addition, regulatory 
obligations are considered by the courts in defining the intermediaries’ duties under 
private law; for example, the ‘best execution’ provision foreseen by Article 21 MiFID 
(see section III, para. 3 below) will help to specify the fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care.8 Arguing differently would contradict the investor protection aims of financial 
markets regulation and jeopardize the harmonisation purposes of the MiFID.9 
However, the extent to which contract law will be either influenced or 
transformed by the MiFID is difficult to assess in advance and will also depend on 
national approaches. Making a forecast from the German perspective, a scholar recently 
                                               
6 See CESR’s Advice on Possible Implementing Measures of the Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in Financial 
Instruments, Consultation Paper, June 2004, 60. 
 
7 Ibid 54. 
 
8 See Köndgen, n 4 above, 121, noting: ‘The statutory rules of conduct drawn up by the Member States will 
broaden tort liability for breach of statutory duties. Moreover, they are likely to inspire the civil courts either to 
add, by implication, the statutory duties to the terms of a contract or to find nove l but equivalent duties of care 
and loyalty so as to expand liability in contract. As a matter of liability both in contract and in tort, it will no 
longer be possible for investment firms to disclaim their fiduciary responsibility’.  
9 See Tison, n 5 above, 76. 
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predicted that the MiFID’s rules of conduct shall intensify the shift in focus that was set 
in motion by the ISD.10 While the traditional German approach to the conduct of 
securities business was embodied in Section 383 et seq. of the German Commercial Code 
(HGB) concerning the commission contract (Kommissionsvertrag), Sections 31 et seq. of 
the Securities Trading Act of 1994 (WpHG) implemented Article 11 of the ISD with 
provisions closely paralleling the contractual and pre-contractual obligations foreseen by 
the HGB. Subsequently, courts and commentators focussed on the WpHG rather than on 
the HGB.11 Considering that the MiFID’s rules of conduct are more detailed than the 
those contained in the ISD, there will be a further shift towards regulatory law producing 
a partial ‘eclipse of contract law’.12 
3. Conduct of Business under the ISD 
The ISD was adopted in 1993 to introduce a single licence for investment 
intermediaries and harmonise some aspects of exchange law.13 Article 11 (1) of the ISD 
required Member States to draw up rules of conduct that investment firms (and banks 
offering investment services) should observe at all times. These rules had to take account 
of the professional nature of the person for whom the service was provided and to 
implement at least the principles set out in Article 11 which, in turn, reflected the IOSCO 
principles on conduct of business.14 Therefore, the harmonisation effected by the ISD was 
very limited, as acknowledged by Article 11 (2) making safe “any decisions to be taken 
                                               
10 P. Mülbert, ‘The Eclipse of Contract Law in the Investment-Firm-Client Relationship’, paper presented at the 
Milan Conference cited at n 3 above. 
 
11 Ibid 3. For instance, the discussion concerning the banks’ duty to provide information to clients focussed on 
Section 31 (2) of the WpHG rather than on pre-contractual obligations. 
 
12 Ibid 18. 
 
13 On the ISD, in general, see G. Ferrarini ‘Towards a European Law of Investment Services and Institutions’ 
(1994) 31 CMLR 1283; Ferrarini (ed), n 4 above; N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 355 et seq. 
14 See Ferrarini, n 3 above, 1304, stating that the ISD principles are very similar to those stated by IOSCO in 
December 1990, which, in turn, are similar to those adopted in the United Kingdom in March of the same year.  
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in the context of the harmonisation of the rules of conduct”,15 while leaving the 
implementation of the rules and supervision of compliance with the same to the Member 
States in which a service was provided.16 This provision created a fundamental difficulty 
for passporting investment firms and was identified as a major weakness in the ISD: 
‘Investment firms are potentially subject to, at the moment, fifteen different 
interpretations of the general principles set out in Article 11 and the associated regulatory 
costs if they choose to provide investment services within all the Member States’.17 As 
explained by the Commission in its Communication on Article 11, there are divergences 
between Member States in the level of conduct of business protection offered to retail 
investors, particularly in the areas of conflicts of interest, ‘best execution’, and conduct of 
business requirements for ‘execution only’ transactions (see section III, para. 2 below).18 
An additional problem was that Article 11 did not clarify when an investment firm could 
be deemed to provide services within a particular Member State and to be subject to its 
conduct-of-business regime.19  
While the ISD established ‘a clear general presumption in favour of the free 
provision of services on the basis of home country authorisation’, some provisions of the 
same admitted ‘the involvement of host country authorities in the interest of the “general 
                                               
15 An author, who had been one of the ISD drafters, excluded that Article 11 resulted in any harmonisation of 
conduct of business at all: C. Cruickshank, ‘Is there a Need to Harmonise Conduct of Business Rules?’, in 
Ferrarini (ed), n 13 above, 132.  
 
16 The Explanatory Memorandum to the original proposal, at COM (88) 778, noted that the rules of conduct were 
not brought within the competence of the home-country authorities for the following reason: ‘At present there 
are considerable divergences between Member States in the content of such rules and the way in which they are 
applied. A considerable furher effort of harmonisation will be needed to permit the application of these rules to 
pass under home-country control’. 
 
17 Moloney, n 13 above, 399.  
 
18 See Commission Communication on The Application of Conduct of Business Rules under Article 11 of the 
Investment Services Directive, COM (2000) 722, also noting that, with respect to professional investors, national 
legislations result in comparable protection. 
 
19 See Moloney, n 13 above, 400, arguing that ‘Article 11 (2) does not specify whether a physical or territorial 
connection between the Member State in which the recipient of an investment service is located and the 
investment firm, such as the temporary presence of representatives of the investment firm, is necessary before 
the Member State can be characterized as the Member State in which the service is provided and its rules can 
apply’. 
 
 6
good”’.20 In particular, Articles 17 (4) and 18 (2) of the ISD provided that the host 
country authorities, which receive notification from a partner country’s investment firm 
intending to establish or provide services in its territory, must, if necessary, ‘indicate to 
the investment firm the conditions, including the rules of conduct, with which, in the 
interest of the general good, the providers of investment services must comply in the host 
Member State’. In the Commission’s opinion, this wording made clear that the host 
authorities wishing to impose local conduct of business rules more prescriptive than the 
minimal harmonisation principles for conduct of business provided by Article 11 (11) 
could do so if this was in the interest of the ‘general good’.21 The Commission relied, in 
this respect, on the case law of the ECJ22 and argued that ‘in exercising responsibilities 
for the enforcement of conduct of business rules, host country authorities could take into 
account two related considerations: (1) whether or not the home state of the service 
provider implements conduct of business rules which offer equivalent protection; and (2) 
whether the imposition of host country rules is a proportionate response to preserving the 
underlying “general good”’.23 
Further harmonisation was needed to reduce the cost of providing cross-border 
services and allow for a home country approach to conduct of business regulation. 
FESCO undertook preliminary work in this direction, which resulted in the publication 
                                               
20 See the Commission Communication on Article 11, n 18 above, 14. 
 
21 Ibid 15. 
 
22 See, for instance, Case C-222/95 Société Civile Immobilière Parodi v Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie (1997) 
ECR I-3899, indicating that ‘as a fundamental principle of the Treaty, t he freedom to provide services may be 
limited only by rules which are justified by imperative reasons relating to the public interest and which apply to 
all persons or undertakings pursuing an activity in the state of destination, insofar as that interest is not protected 
by the rules to which the person providing the services is subject in the Member State in which he is established. 
In particular, those requirements must be objectively necessary in order to ensure compliance with professional 
rules and to guarantee the protection of the recipient of services and they must not exceed what is necessary to 
attain those objectives (…)’.  
 
23 See the Commission Communication, n 18 above, 15. 
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by CESR of a document on the harmonisation of conduct of business rules.24 In this 
document, CESR developed common standards and rules for investor protection by 
specifying the basic conduct of business requirements foreseen by Article 11 ISD, with 
three aims in mind: (i) ensuring an equivalent degree of investor protection throughout 
the EEA; (ii) reducing impediments to competition and competitive distortions between 
investment firms; (iii) fostering co-operation between competent authorities. CESR’s 
work on conduct of business rules no doubt influenced the formation of the 
corresponding provisions of the MiFID and is also likely to affect level 2 legislation in 
this area. However, the Directive did not incorporate CESR’s standards which were to a 
large extent modified, so that also the MiFID’s implementing measures will not 
necessarily reflect CESR’s rules. 
4. Role of Harmonisation  
In order to justify regulatory harmonisation, there must be some market failure 
going beyond national borders and not adequately dealt with by national regulators.25 
Two main goals are pursued by harmonisation with respect to cross-border financial 
services: one is the reduction of transaction costs determined by uniformity of the rules; 
the other is the lowering of protectionist barriers. In the case of investment 
intermediaries, three sets of reasons are currently invoked to explain harmonisation of 
conduct of business rules. Firstly, reference to a single rulebook reduces transaction costs 
as investment services providers would otherwise have to comply with a different 
rulebook for each country in which they operate. Secondly, common standards and rules 
make it more difficult for Member States to use domestic law as a barrier to foreign 
                                               
24 CESR, A European Regime of Investor Protection: The Harmonisation of Conduct of Business Rules, April 
2002.  
 
25 See G. Ferrarini, ‘Securities regulation and the Rise of Pan-European Securities Markets: An Overview’, in 
Ferrarini, Hopt and Wymeersch, n 5 above, 249, citing L. White, ‘Competition versus Harmonisation: An 
Overview of International Regulation of Financial Services’, in C. E. Barfield (ed), International Financial 
Markets: Harmonisation versus Competition (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996), 28. 
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investment intermediaries. Thirdly, if rules are uniform, regulators perform their 
supervisory functions more efficiently also by way of international co-operation, while 
finding it more difficult to protect domestic firms from foreign competitors. 
However, these arguments do not always justify harmonised mandatory rules. On 
the one hand, transaction costs reductions can also be achieved through voluntary 
common standards such as those adopted by CESR in 2002. On the other, conduct of 
business rules supplement contract terms and can, to some extent, be departed from by 
the parties. As noted by American law and economics scholars: ‘Legal rules exist, in part, 
to clarify the contractual relationships that exist between the parties; i.e., to encourage 
transactions by economizing on transaction costs… The rules requiring best execution 
supply for free certain contractual terms to everybody who buys or sells securities 
through an agent’.26 Accordingly, conduct of business rules are, in part, default rules that 
the parties can set aside: for instance, the ‘suitability’ rule foreseen by Article 19 (5) 
MiFID does not apply to ‘execution only’ services, if the requirements foreseen by 
Article 19 (6) are complied with (see section III, para. 2 below). Another example is that 
of contracts with ‘eligible counterparties’ (Article 24 MiFID) to whom trading services 
(such as execution of orders, dealing on own account, and receipt and transmission of 
orders) can be offered by investment firms without being subject to the obligations 
concerning conduct of business, best execution and client order handling. 
The latter provision helps to set the MiFID’s provisions in context. Regulation is 
not justified when investors can cater to their needs, as is the case with sophisticated 
investors. Article 24 (2) defines ‘eligible counterparties’ as, amongst others, ‘investment 
firms, credit institutions, insurance companies, UCITS and their management companies, 
                                               
26 J. Macey and M. O’Hara, ‘The Law and Economics of Best Execution’ (1997) 6 J. Fin. Int. 193, citing F. 
Easterbrook and D. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Col. L. Rev. 1416. 
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pension funds and their management companies’.27 Article 24 (3) adds that ‘Member 
States may also recognise as eligible counterparties other undertakings meeting pre-
determined proportionate requirements, including quantitative thresholds’.28 The regime 
provided for transactions with eligible counterparties by Article 24 (3) is such that the 
obligations indicated by Article 19 (conduct of business), 21 (best execution) and 22 (1) 
(client order handling) do not apply, unless the same counterparties request ‘either on a 
general form or on a trade by trade basis’ that these obligations apply (opt-in regime). If 
the opt-in faculty is exercised, the ‘professional client’ regime applies by default, unless 
the eligible counterparty requests an even higher level of protection and the investment 
firm accepts, in which case the ‘retail client’ regime will apply.29 If the opt-in is not 
exercised, all the MiFID’s obligations other than those explicitly excluded will apply.30 
 
II. The Lamfalussy Regulatory Structure 
1. General 
The Lamfalussy Committee was established by ECOFIN on 17 July 2000 with a 
mandate to assess the current conditions for the implementation of securities markets 
regulation in the European Union. The Committee was asked “to assess how the 
mechanism for regulating those markets can best respond to developments, and, in order 
to eliminate barriers, to propose scenarios for adapting current practices to ensure greater 
                                               
27 Article 24 (2) also indicates ‘other financial institutions authorised or regulated under Community legislation 
or the national law of a Member State, undertakings exempted from the application of this Directive under 
Article 2(1)(K) and (l), national governments and their corresponding offices including public bodies that deal 
with public debt, central banks and supranational organisations’.  
 
28  It is also specified that ‘in the event of a transaction where the prospective counterparties are located in 
different jurisdictions, the investment firm shall defer to the status of the other undertaking as determined by the 
law or measures of the Member State in which that undertaking is established’.  
 
29 See CESR’s Draft Technical Advice on Possible Implementing Measures of the Directive 2004/39/EC on 
Markets in Financial Instruments, 2nd Set of Mandates, Consultation Paper, October 2004, 55. 
 
30 Ibid 54: ‘For example, if an investment firm holds financial instruments belonging to an eligible counterparty 
while providing services falling within Article 24 (1) of the Directive, the requirements relating to the holding of 
client financial instruments under Article 13 (7) of the Directive will continue to apply’.  
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convergence and cooperation in day-to-day implementation.” As a result, a new structure 
was set up to improve the responsiveness of the European regulatory framework to 
developments rapidly occurring in the financial sector, by increasing the system’s 
flexibility and the quality of regulation. New committees were also established such as 
the European Securities Committee (ESC) established in June 2001 with both advisory 
and regulatory capacities; and the European Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC) 
also established in June 2001 with various responsibilities including that for advising the 
European Commission on the detailed implementing rules needed to give effect to 
framework securities laws.31 
2. Framework Principles  
The Lamfalussy Committee suggested that Directives and Regulations in the 
securities area should include framework principles, whilst implementing powers should 
be delegated to a second level.32 In the Committee’s opinion, the framework principles 
are “the core political principles, the essential elements of each proposal”: “They 
determine the political direction and orientation, the fundamentals of each decision”. 
However, “level 1 principles should clearly specify the nature and the extent of the 
technical implementing measures that should be taken at the second level …”. To clarify 
the distinction between framework principles and implementing measures the Committee 
offered two examples: one relating to the forthcoming Prospectus Directive, which would 
include principles on the “type of single passport” (shelf registration, definition of a 
public offer, role and powers of competent authorities, language regime) leaving the 
“contents of the prospectus” to level 2; the other concerning the conduct of business rules 
under Article 11 ISD: “A new text would include the basic elements of these rules … The 
                                               
31 See E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press: 2004), 75 et seq.  
 
32 See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities markets, Brussels, 
15 February 2001, p. 25. 
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implementing measures would contain the detailed rules that investment firms should 
apply in their relations with clients …”.  
However, even with respect to the examples made, the distinction between basic 
principles and detailed rules is far from clear. What distinguishes a “core political 
principle” from a simple rule? How far can a Directive go in specifying a principle 
without invading the territory of implementing measures? To help answer these 
questions, the Lamfalussy Report carried an Annex B including a draft “prototype 
Directive” formulating basic conduct of business rules. The Annex was headed: 
‘Selection of rules set out in FESCO’s consultative paper on the harmonization of core 
conduct of business rules for investor protection’. Interestingly, only rules were 
mentioned, while the FESCO’s paper and the subsequent CESR’s document on the 
harmonization of conduct of business rules referred to both rules and standards, making 
the following distinction: ‘The standards are intended to be the key parameters for a 
harmonised conduct of business regime. The rules implement the standards, clarifying 
their scope and practical meaning’.33 The Lamfalussy Committee clearly intended the 
framework principles to be broader than CESR’s standards: the principles suggested in 
the ‘prototype directive’ included both the standards and the rules found in CESR’s 
document. This led to considerable detail in the suggested provisions, similar to that 
characterizing the MiFID. 
In practice, the watershed between core principles and implementing rules is 
found at level 1 through negotiation within the co-decision procedure required for a 
Directive/Regulation.34 Therefore, the question is more political than doctrinal, and 
entails negotiations between the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European 
Parliament. Attributing an issue to the area of core principles is relevant to the kind of 
                                               
33 CESR, n 24 above, 3. 
 
34 Report, n 32 above, 24. 
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procedure to be followed, given that level 1 Directives/Regulations are adopted through 
co-decision, while level 2 measures are subject to comitology. Whenever a conflict arises 
over a policy issue amongst Member States or interest groups, the question is likely to be 
treated at level 1 rather than being left to comitology, and the solutions tend to be 
sufficiently specific to avoid further discussion at level 2. As I argue in this paper, one of 
the main problems affecting European securities regulation is that framework principles 
are often too detailed, touching upon political issues which are frequently highly 
technical and ill-suited to level 1 type of legislation.  
For the rest, the advantages of the Lamfalussy structure are easily described.35 
First of all, the legislative process speeds up to the extent that key Level 1 political co-
decision negotiations “focus solely on the essential issues and not on technical 
implementing details”. Moreover, flexibility does not rule out the democratic process, as 
the range and scope of implementing measures is determined by co-decision at Level 1. 
In addition, the European institutions can benefit from the technical expertise of national 
securities regulators. However, for these advantages to occur, core principles must cover 
“essential issues” and “technical details” are discussed at Level 1 only to fix the range 
and scope of implementing measures. Otherwise, co-decision negotiations would get 
embroiled in a web of technical issues for which the European institutions may lack 
expertise, while interest groups would try to capture individual MEPs and national 
Governments so as to protect their rents. No doubt, similar problems could also affect 
Level 2 as national Governments’ officials participate to ESC, while the Commission 
lacks the independence from political power that distinguishes securities regulators, at 
least those constituted in the form of independent agencies. This poses additional 
questions: whether more room should be left to Level 3 and whether more independence 
should be guaranteed as to the formulation of implementing measures. 
                                               
35 Ibid 24 et seq. 
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3. Levels 3 and 4 
Levels 3 and 4 of the Lamfalussy structure mainly concern the implementation 
and enforcement of European Directives in the securities area. Level 3 is grounded on co-
operation and networking amongst national regulators through CESR. Its essence is “to 
greatly improve the consistency of the day to day transposition and implementation of 
Levels 1 and 2 legislation”.36 The national regulators acting in co-operative network have 
the main responsibility for this task. The role and functions of CESR are, therefore, 
defined as follows: (i) to produce guidelines for national administrative regulations; (ii) to 
issue interpretative recommendations and set common standards regarding matters not 
covered by EU legislation; (iii) to review regulatory practices and ensure effective 
enforcement; (iv) to conduct peer reviews of administrative regulation and regulatory 
practices. Level 4 concerns the strengthening of Community rules’ enforcement: the 
major responsibility falls on the European Commission, even if all actors, including the 
regulators (as seen for Level 3), have a role to play.37 The two levels therefore overlap, to 
the extent that implementation and enforcement of rules are closely intertwined. The 
main difference between the two levels is probably found in the responsible institutions 
and relevant activities: while Level 3 insists on regulators’ networking and CESR, Level 
4 focuses on the Commission as “guardian of the European Treaties”. 
This point was clarified by the Financial Services Action Plan’s execution, as 
shown by CESR in a recent document.38 While presenting CESR’s views on how it 
should organize its role at level 3 under the Lamfalussy procedure, this document 
implicitly redefined the Committee’s role and tasks with respect to those found in the 
Lamfalussy Report, also in light of the Commission Decision establishing CESR and the 
                                               
36 Ibid 37. 
 
37 Ibid 40. 
 
38 The Role of CESR at ‘Level 3’ Under the Lamfalussy Process. Action Plan for 2005 (October 2004). 
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CESR’s Charter. The Committee’s role would concern three issues: (i) co-ordinated 
implementation of EU law, which includes transposing directives into national laws and 
applying EU law on a daily basis; (ii) regulatory convergence, i.e. establishing common 
approaches to facilitate harmonized implementation of EU law; (iii) supervisory 
convergence, i.e. co-operation amongst regulators under the European 
Directives/Regulations.39 In CESR’s view, therefore, both implementation and 
enforcement are included in its competences, which cover a broad range of issues of a 
regulatory and supervisory nature. 
4. Assessing the Lamfalussy Structure 
The Lamfalussy regulatory structure has been assessed by Eilís Ferran in a timely 
and thought-provoking volume40 analysing EU securities markets regulation from the 
perspective of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in general and of the new issuer 
disclosure regime, as included in the Market Abuse Directive41 and the Prospectus 
Directive42, in particular. The author identifies problems ‘in three key areas: the balance 
between regulatory harmonisation and diversity, where some recent changes may have 
shifted the balance too far in favour of a standardised approach; excessive reliance on 
regulation as the first-choice policy tool at the expense of due attention to supervision; 
and insufficient regards to the consequences of EU regulation on the global 
competitiveness of its securities markets’.43 The present paper is in agreement with this 
analysis and the detailed arguments supporting it. Also the suggestion of ‘a mixed 
strategy that combines some reliance on regulatory competition within the EU alongside 
                                               
39 Ibid 5. 
 
40 See n 31 above. 
 
41 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse), OJ 2003 L96/16. 
 
42 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading.  
 
43 Ferran, n 31 above, 2. 
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judicious use of EU regulatory powers to impose harmonised regulation in certain 
situations’44 deserves support, as well as the statement that there are benefits in maximum 
harmonisation ‘but they come at a cost, in terms of rigidity and loss of a useful stream of 
feedback about regulatory innovations which have been tested out at national level’.45 
Concerning the regulatory process for securities law-making in the EU, Ferran reaches 
the conclusion, amongst others, ‘that, though not perfect, the Lamfalussy process is a step 
in the right direction’ and should be seen ‘as a pragmatic solution to a multidimensional, 
difficult problem’, yet without uncritically accepting how it operates.46 The author argues 
that the line between Level 1 and Level 2 legislation reflects political realities and is put 
sometimes in the wrong place if judged from a theoretical perspective. However, the 
system is sufficiently robust to withstand some degree of misplacement and problems 
will diminish as time goes on ‘as the Council and European Parliament become less wary 
of dropping matters down to level 2 (and also to level 3)’.47 In general terms, the author 
does not see a pan-European securities market regulator and supervisor as offering a 
superior way forward: her ‘preferred option is to build upon and refine the existing 
regulatory and supervisory framework’,48 also being unclear whether Member States 
would tolerate delegating rule-making power in respect of the most controversial issues 
to a regulatory agency.49  
In this paper, whilst following similar criticisms as to recent developments of EU 
securities regulation, I put more emphasis on the limits of the new rules particularly with 
regard to the MiFID, and adopt a more radical stance as to applicable remedies, 
                                               
44 Ibid 53. 
 
45 Ibid 55. 
 
46 Ibid 123-124. 
 
47 Ibid 124. 
 
48 Ibid 2. 
 
49 Ibid 119. 
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supporting the claim for a European regulatory agency (an issue which is only briefly 
considered in section IV below, given the paper’s focus on rules of conduct50). I argue, in 
particular, that the system has gone too far by producing remarkably detailed Level 1 
legislation, while regulating at levels 1 and 2 issues suitable for level 3 action. Moreover, 
I argue that the MiFID has resulted in substantial re-regulation of conduct of business by 
investment intermediaries that negatively affects private autonomy and introduces into 
the system rigidities contrary to the spirit of the Lamfalussy process. In a companion 
paper,51 my co-author and I argue (in line with previous work on the draft Directive)52 
that a fully fledged European regulation was not needed for regulated markets while 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) were not yet ripe for European harmonisation. In 
fact, the scope for the regulated markets’ treatment in the MiFID should have been 
narrower, concentrating on issues for which regulatory divergences determine higher 
transaction costs.53 Similar comments can be made for MTFs, also considering that MTF 
operations are not extensively developed across Europe, presumably as a result of the 
relative efficiency of stock exchange trading.54 The present paper concludes that the 
Lamfalussy structure has not delivered the expected results, at least with reference to the 
MiFID, whilst acknowledging that this does not entirely depend on the new regulatory 
                                               
50 See, in particular, G. Hertig and R. Lee, ‘Four Predictions about the Future of EU Securities Regulation’ 
(2003) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 359-377, who predict the creation of a European Securities 
Commission despite objecting to it in theory. 
 
51 See G. Ferrarini and F. Recine, n 3 above. 
 
52 See G. Ferrarini, ‘Pan-European Securities Markets: Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses’ (2002) 3 
European Business Organization Law Review 249-292. 
 
53 Regulated markets are already subject to regulation and supervision in all Member States, and no clear reasons 
are found for systematic harmonisation across Europe. Differences in regulation between the Member States do 
not appear to cause greater transaction costs to stock exchanges’ users, except for clearing and settlement 
systems in respect to which the case for legal harmonisation has been repeatedly advanced. Moreover, there is no 
clear protectionism of national exchanges by the Member States suggesting adop tion of European rules, also 
considering that anticompetitive behaviour would be contrasted by the antitrust provisions of the Treaty.  
 
54 Therefore, the reasons for harmonizing their regulation are unclear, unless reference is made to the need to 
provide a level playing field to all trading systems (stock exchanges, MTFs and “systematic internalizers”). 
However, this need was felt by the incumbent exchanges more than by the new trading systems and the new 
rules were to some extent  inspired by the former to counter competition by the latter. 
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framework, but on the resistance of EU institutions in shifting regulatory power below 
level 1. 
 
III. The MiFiD’s Rules of Conduct 
In this section, I critically analyse the MiFID’s provisions which directly concern 
conduct of business by investment intermediaries, such as those on conflicts of interest, 
honesty and fairness of intermediaries, suitability of investment services and products, 
best execution of transactions, and prompt and fair handling of client orders. 
1. Conflicts of Interest  
Amongst the general provisions concerning the ‘operating conditions for 
investment firms’ (Chapter II of the MiFiD), those on conflict of interest are included in 
Article 18 and appear linked to the ‘organisational requirements’ foreseen by Article 13 
(3).55 Firstly, conflicts of interest that arise in the course of providing investment and 
ancillary services should be identified by investment firms. Secondly, these conflicts 
should be managed by investment firms in compliance with the relevant organisational 
requirements. Thirdly, where the organizational requirements are not sufficient to 
reasonably prevent the risk of damage to client interests, conflicts of interest should be 
disclosed to the client before undertaking business on her behalf (Article 18 (2)). This 
type of regulation is not new. Already in the ISD conflicts of interest were dealt through 
organisational requirements and rules of conduct56. The fact that transparency is a ‘last 
resort’ measure assumes that clients, including retail clients, are able to assess the risk of 
                                               
55 Article 13 (3) provides: ‘An investment firm shall maintain and operate effective organisational and 
administrative arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps designed to prevent conflicts of interest as 
defined in Article 18 from adversely affecting the interests of its clients’.  
 
56 See Moloney, n 13 above, 536 et seq; B. Rider, Conflicts of Interest: An English Problem?, in Ferrarini (ed), n 
4 above, 149. 
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damages potentially deriving from conflicts of interest; it also assumes that investors 
spend time in analysing the information at issue, an assumption not easily accepted. 57  
Those included in Article 18 are no doubt framework principles that require 
further specification. Accordingly, Article 18 (3) foresees the adoption of implementing 
measures by the Commission. CESR, in its draft advice to the Commission, has proposed 
more detailed rules than those included in its 2002 document, for example with reference 
to ‘measures to assure independence’58. In CESR’s opinion, the organizational 
arrangements to be maintained by investment firms should include the separation of at 
least the persons engaged in certain activities (proprietary trading, portfolio management, 
corporate finance) by information barriers (‘Chinese walls’). However, the investment 
firm would be admitted to show that it has implemented alternative arrangements to 
prevent conflicts of interest from adversely affecting the interests of clients. Moreover, 
CESR suggested indicating other measures to provide an appropriate degree of 
independence to persons engaged in different business activities. These measures would 
include separating supervision on different activities within the firm; making the 
remuneration of relevant persons principally engaged in one activity independent of the 
remuneration of relevant persons principally engaged in the other activity; etc.  
CESR’s proposals are well grounded and would allow for the flexibility required 
by fast changing financial services. It is difficult to see, however, why similar provisions 
should be adopted at level 2 of the Lamfalussy structure, rather than being left to level 3 
action by regulators, as the technical character of the questions at issue and the 
organisational choices involved would suggest. Moreover, supervision should have a 
greater role than regulation in this area, given the wide discretion left to investment firms 
                                               
57 On the MiFID’s approach to investor choice and empowerment, see N. Moloney, ‘Promoting the Retail 
Investor: The EU’s Emerging Stategy and Conduct of Business Regulation’, paper presented at the Milan 
Conference, n 3 above, finding in the Directive ‘a retail investor regime that intervenes only lightly  in the 
investor/investment firm relationship’ (at 42). 
 
58 CESR, n 6 above, 41. 
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as to their organisational arrangements. The main reason for adopting detailed rules at 
level 2 appears to be that of enhancing the harmonisation of conduct of business, as level 
3 measures would not be binding on Member States. It needs to be shown, however, that 
flexible rules such as those proposed by CESR will effectively result in a uniform 
treatment at European level, while uniformity will also depend on supervisory co-
ordination within CESR. 
2. General Obligations  
Amongst the provisions to ensure investor protection (Chapter II, Section 2), 
Article 19 specifies the conduct of business obligations applicable to investment firms 
under the general clause fixed by its first paragraph: ‘Member States shall require that, 
when providing investment services and/or, where appropriate, ancillary services to 
clients, an investment firm act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the 
best interests of its clients (…)’. The subsequent paragraphs state the principles 
concerning information to clients, suitability of the investment service or product, 
‘execution only’ services, documentation and reporting.  
These principles are set at a fairly general level (with the exceptions indicated 
below) and will be further detailed at level 2 along the lines already suggested by CESR 
in its draft advice. Also the suitability standard is fixed at a general level by Article 19 (4) 
which requires investment firms providing investment advice or portfolio management to 
obtain from its client or potential client the information (as to his knowledge, experience, 
financial situation and investment objectives) needed to recommend to the same ‘the 
investment services and financial instruments that are suitable to him’; and by Article 19 
(5) which requires investment firms providing services other than those just indicated to 
ask the client or potential client to provide similar information ‘so as to enable the 
investment firm to assess whether the investment service or product envisaged is 
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appropriate for the client’59. Greater specification is found in Article 19 (6) concerning 
‘execution only’ services. When providing investment services that only consist of 
execution and/or reception and transmission of client orders, investment firms shall be 
allowed not to obtain the client’s information or make the determination as to suitability 
under para. 5 of the same Article, if the following conditions are met: (i) the services 
relate to shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, money market instruments, 
bonds or other forms of securitised debt (excluding those embedding a derivative), 
UCITS and other non-complex financial instruments; (ii) the service is provided at the 
initiative of the client or potential client; (iii) the client has been clearly informed that the 
suitability rule does not apply; (iv) the investment firm complies with its obligations as to 
conflicts of interest.  
These detailed requirements clearly exceed the boundaries of the framework 
principle’s notion. They were included in the MiFID for the simple reason that the 
treatment of ‘execution only’ services was highly controversial at the time of the 
Directive’s drafting. The divide between Member States (with the UK supporting a 
liberal treatment that other States rejected) was reflected by the discussion between 
European institutions. The Commission’s original proposal referred basic suitability 
requirements also to execution only services, while Parliament defended investor choice 
as to low-cost execution services60. In its first reading, Parliament removed the suitability 
requirement from the treatment of those services, so as to allow investors to make 
independent investment decisions based on their own research and use low-cost 
execution services protected by background protections such as contract requirements, 
product regulation, disclosure, etc. A similar approach was supported by the market, so 
                                               
59 Article 19 (5) adds the following: ‘In case the investment firm considers, on the basis of the information 
received under the previous paragraph, that the product or service is not appropriate to the client or potential 
client, the investment firm shall warn the client or potential client. This warning may be provi ded in a 
standardized format’. 
 
60 Moloney, n 57 above, 39. 
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that the Council’s Common Position removed the suitability requirement for execution 
only services, whilst introducing the detailed regime that we now find in the MiFID. 
Article 19 (6), therefore, embodies a compromise: firstly, best execution and fair trading 
requirements always apply; secondly, execution-only services may only be provided at 
the initiative of the client, a requirement the compliance with which may be difficult to 
monitor; thirdly and ‘paternalistically’, threshold requirements as to the ‘non-complex’ 
nature of investments have been imposed.61 From the present paper’s perspective, not 
only controversial issues tend to receive detailed consideration at Level 1, but the 
relevant discussion leads to compromises which are either difficult to enforce or lack a 
clear rationale. It is enough to reflect on the notion of ‘non-complex’ financial 
instrument, which is difficult to define and not necessarily relevant to investor protection 
(as an investor’s understanding of a given instrument is not necessarily correlated to its 
‘complexity’62). 
For the sake of completeness, Article 20 should also be mentioned dealing with 
the case of an investment firm receiving an instruction to perform investment or ancillary 
services on behalf of a client through the medium of another investment firm. In a similar 
case, the ‘performing firm’ is entitled to rely on client information transmitted by the 
‘instructing firm’, in particular to assess the suitability of the investment service or 
product to the client; likewise, the ‘performing firm’ can rely on the recommendations in 
respect of the service or transaction that have been provided to the client by the 
‘instructing firm’. Accordingly, the ‘instructing firm’ remains responsible for the 
information transmitted or the advice given, whereas the ‘performing firm’ is responsible 
for the compliance with the other provisions of Title II (‘Authorisation and Operating 
Conditions for Investment Firms) of the MiFID.  
                                               
61 Ibid 
 
62 For example, investing in shares does not always require less sophistication and understanding than buying a 
derivative. 
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3. Best Execution 
Article 21 tackles the controversial issue of best execution within the new 
regulatory framework of trading activities, which allows for ‘internalisation’ of orders63 
and implicitly forbids ‘concentration rules’, i.e. rules requiring brokers to execute their 
client orders concerning listed securities only in regulated markets.64 The best execution 
principle is formulated by Article 21 (1) in wide terms as follows: ‘Member States shall 
require that investment firms take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, 
the best possible result for their clients taking into account prices, costs, speed, likelihood 
of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the 
execution of the order. Nevertheless, whenever there is a specific instruction from the 
client the investment firm shall execute the order following the specific instruction’. This 
provision attracts at least two preliminary comments. Firstly, its ample formulation 
deserves approval, as it is widely acknowledged that order execution should be assessed 
not only in terms of price, but also on the basis of different criteria such as size of the 
order, speed of execution, etc., as foreseen by the provision at issue.65 Secondly, the best 
execution principle supplements contract terms and, therefore, the parties are free to 
regulate order execution differently; in particular, the client can give ‘specific 
instructions’ to the investment firm and the latter is bound to comply with them.66 
                                               
63 Internalisation is defined as ‘the situation in which a bank or a broker executes retail client orders in-house, 
that is either by acting as a principal and executing them aga inst its own positions or by sending them to an 
affiliated market maker’: R. Davies, A. Dufour and B. Scott-Quinn, ‘The MiFID: Competition in a New Equity 
Market Regulatory Structure’, paper presented at the Milan Conference, n 3 above, 6. The MiFID narrowly 
defines the ‘systematic internaliser’ as ‘an investment firm which, on an organised, frequent and systematic 
basis, deals on own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market or an MTF’ (Article 4 (1) No 
7). 
 
64 Similar rules were allowed under Article 14 ISD: see Ferrarini, ‘The European regulation of Stock Exchanges: 
New Perspectives’ (1999) 36 Common Market law Review 569-598. 
 
65 See Macey and O’Hara, n 26 above. 
 
66 See n 26 above and accompanying text. 
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The regulatory system concerning the execution of transactions will be 
profoundly affected in those countries where concentration rules are still in force (like 
France, Italy and Spain). While concentration of trades in regulated markets offered a 
relatively easy way to best execution, the freedom granted to intermediaries by the 
MiFID requires careful analysis of best execution criteria for compliance and 
enforcement purposes. Article 21 was to some extent inspired by those jurisdictions, like 
the UK, where the trading of listed securities is already subject to a principle of freedom. 
Also in the US, best execution has always played a central role, deriving from the 
common law agency duty of loyalty rather than from regulatory fiat; however, the SEC 
and Congress gave practical implementation to this requirement through the 
establishment of the National Market System,67 while self-regulatory organisations have 
adopted rules guiding their members to obtain best execution of customer orders. In 
contrast, the absence of an integrated market in Europe creates further regulatory 
problems as the same security might be traded in multiple venues based in different 
jurisdictions. 
Article 21 (1) defines best execution broadly, making reference to various aspects 
of trade execution other than price. This is undoubtedly correct, even though assessing 
such a broad concept of best execution in individual cases may be difficult. It is not easy, 
for example, to compare price data with those concerning speed of execution and 
settlement. Therefore, choosing between best price and high speed of execution may be 
hard in some cases depending on the type of client, transaction and financial instrument. 
Yet, a narrow reading of best execution requirements that focuses, for instance, on 
transaction price and (monetary) cost of execution, would unduly restrain trading 
freedom and negatively affect competition between trading venues. As a result, legal 
systems must choose between a broad notion of best execution diluting the same to the 
                                               
67 See SEC, Market 2000. An Examination of Current Equity Market Developments, January 1994, Study V, 2. 
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point of making it almost meaningless and a narrow concept which would likely benefit 
the incumbent markets limiting the development of new trading venues.68Also the 
concentration rules in force in some Member States, while restraining competition, found 
support on grounds of best execution and fair trading as they made compliance easier and 
monitoring less costly.  
The MiFID’s treatment of best execution is a response to similar difficulties. On 
the one side, Article 21 (1) enounces a broad concept that is consistent with the 
Directive’s liberalisation goals as to the market for trading venues. On the other, the 
subsequent paragraphs specify the best execution concept narrowing its scope and 
making its impact on competition less effective. Article 21 (2) limits the exercise of 
discretion by intermediaries asking investment firms ‘to establish and implement an order 
execution policy to allow them to obtain, for their client orders, the best possible result in 
accordance with paragraph 1’. Article 21 (3) requires the order execution policy to 
include ‘information on the different venues where the investment firm executes its client 
orders and the factors affecting the choice of execution venue’. The same policy ‘shall at 
least include those venues that enable the investment firm to obtain on a consistent basis 
the best possible result for the execution of client orders”. These provisions might be 
enforced in the Member States so as to protect regulated markets and MTFs against 
internalisers. Para. 3, in particular, appears as intended to protect the incumbent 
exchanges which would generally provide the ‘consistent basis’ needed to assure best 
execution of client orders. Furthermore, this paragraph requires investment firms which 
foresee in their order execution policy the possibility that client orders may be executed 
outside a regulated market or an MTF to inform their clients about it and obtain their 
                                               
68 See J. Macey and M. O’Hara, ‘The Law and Economics of Best Execution” (1997) 6 Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 188 arguing that “well -meaning attempts to mandate best execution as a consumer-protection 
device run counter to attempts to make markets less centralised and more competitive” and that “this difficulty 
makes best execution both un-wieldly and unworkable as a mandated legal duty: pursuing a narrow concept of 
best execution may make markets less competitive”.  
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express consent before proceeding to execute their orders outside a regulated market or 
MTF (this consent may be obtained also in the form of a general agreement). Therefore, 
best execution is regulated in a way that, while leaving intermediaries free to choose (and 
clients free to give them different instructions), potentially favours the incumbents rather 
than the new trading venues. This was probably intended as a “compensation” for 
countries losing through the MiFiD the possibility to maintain concentration rules. It is 
also likely that these countries will try to interpret the new provisions in ways that could 
narrow its scope and limit its impact on competition. After all, Article 21 is loose enough 
to allow room for manoeuvre in one sense or the other, depending on where its provisions 
are implemented and enforced. 
4. Order Handling 
Article 22 includes order handling rules.  The framework principle is stated by 
paragraph 1, asking Member States ‘to require that investment firms authorised to execute 
orders on behalf of clients implement procedures and arrangements which provide for the 
prompt, fair and expeditious execution of client orders, relative to other client orders or the 
trading interests of the trading firm’. This provision is complemented by a time priority 
requirement fixed by the same paragraph.69 Paragraph 2 takes care of limit orders70 
concerning shares admitted to trading on a regulated market which are not immediately 
executed under prevailing market conditions. The fact that these orders are kept secret by 
intermediaries receiving the same may deprive the market of important information on 
overall trading interests with respect to a given security and excludes the possibility for other 
intermediaries to transact against the relevant orders. In order to improve market 
transparency and openness, Article 22 (2) requires investment firms to make the orders in 
                                               
69 See the second sentence of Article 22 (1): ‘These procedures or arrangements shall allow for the execution of 
otherwise comparable client orders in accordance with the time of their reception by the investment firm ’. 
70 A limit order is an order to buy or sell at a specific price, as opposed to a market order, which is an order to 
buy or sell at the best price available in the market: see J. Coffee and J. Seligman, Securities Regulation. Cases 
and Materials (New York, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 2003), 653. 
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question public (unless the client expressly instructs otherwise) in a manner which is easily 
accessible to other market participants. This provision was inspired by US regulation and, 
like the latter, intends to allow for price improvements in the client’s interest: the Order 
Handling Rules adopted by the SEC in 1996 include a ‘display rule’ (Rule 11AC1-4) under 
which dealers who accept limit orders and specialists must display any customer’s limit 
order, including their full size, when the order is placed at a price superior to the market 
maker or specialist’s own quotation.71 Therefore, if the prices quoted by market makers left 
an artificially wide spread, a new source of competition would be introduced by allowing 
public customers to introduce price quotations that would narrow the bid/ask spread. As a 
result, brokers holding market orders from their clients would be required by their duty of 
best execution to execute their trades against these limit orders72. In addition, the Order 
Handling rules give an alternative to the market-maker that did not want to improve its 
quotation: it could send the limit order to an ECN or a market-maker that would comply with 
the display rule.  
Similarly, Article 22 (2) is directed to generate price improvements by making public 
and therefore accessible to other investors those limit orders which are not immediately 
executed by the internalisers receiving them. The means for making public the orders at issue 
are not specified. Therefore, also trade information and execution systems other than 
regulated markets and MTF could be used by internalisers: for example, a bilateral system 
operated by the same internalising firm or a trade execution system operated by an 
information provider. However, Article 22 (2) further specifies that “Member States may 
decide that investment firms comply with this obligation by transmitting the client limit order 
to a regulated market or MTF”. This specification is apparently justified by the aim to assure 
                                               
71 Ibid. 
 
72 Ibid, where the following example is made: ‘…if the market maker’s quotation were $18 bid and $19 asked, a 
customer might place a limit order with this market -maker to buy at 18.50, and this would improve the market-
maker’s bid quotation to $18.50 bid and 19 asked …’. 
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that the relevant orders are made public and accessible in an effective way. However, 
Member States could be led by protectionism and exploit this option simply to protect their 
domestic markets. 
Article 22 is, therefore, open to criticism on grounds similar to those concerning other 
MiFID’s provisions. While its first paragraph includes a rather uncontroversial framework 
principle as to order handling in general, its second paragraph tackles an issue which is 
highly technical and ill-suited for discussion at level 1 of the Lamfalussy procedure. 
Moreover, the provision adopted, being inspired by US legislation, is unprecedented in 
Europe. The Member States already allowing for internalisation of share trading by 
investment intermediaries do not foresee anything like the US display rule in their domestic 
legislations, while the Member States forced by the MiFID to introduce internalisation 
lobbied for a similar rule to protect domestic stock exchanges and brokers against the large 
investment banks’ internalising share trades.  Under the MiFID’s display rule, limit orders by 
equity investors will either improve the internalisers’ quotations or be disclosed to the 
market. Furthermore, Member States deleting concentration rules will likely require that limit 
orders be sent to regulated markets and MTFs in an effort to protect the same from the 
domination of mainly Anglo-American investment banks. While the political implications of 
the display rule are quite clear, its impact on European markets is difficult to predict; also the 
US precedent may be of limited value given the different structure of US and European 
securities markets, and the existence of a National Market System in the US. In Europe, 
equity markets are, to some extent, still fragmented along national borders, while the 
MiFID’s display rule by allowing for some discretion in its implementation generates doubts 
about the effectiveness of harmonisation and the regulatory bite of Article 22 
 
IV. Conclusions 
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This paper has shown that the main goals of the Lamfalussy architecture have not been 
reached by the MiFID’s rules of conduct. Level 1 provisions are too detailed and deal with 
very technical issues, contrary to Lamfalussy’s original suggestions73. The implementing 
measures are too specific and substantially contribute to the re-regulation of business 
conduct, while leaving little room for standards at level 3. As a result, conduct of business 
rules have possibly become more uniform, but also more abstract and rigid. In addition, 
substantial compromises have been made on core level 1 provisions, diminishing their 
regulatory bite and intrinsic logic. Interest groups have played an important role at level 1 
exerting their pressure on the Commission, Council and Parliament. This may explain why 
the MiFID and its rules of conduct were ultimately received with approval by the markets 
and the Lamfalussy exercise was seen as a political success, leading to complex regulations 
being adopted in a fairly short time. However, the cost paid by EU securities regulation is 
substantial in terms of rigidity, complexity and politicisation, while the effectiveness of 
harmonisation still needs to be proven. It is fair to add that the problems examined 
throughout this paper do not necessarily derive from the Lamfalussy architecture, but were 
also created by the political actors’ willingness to treat the most controversial regulatory 
issues at level 1, adding to the complexity and ineffectiveness of primary securities 
legislation. It is also worth considering that moving to level 2 some of the relevant issues 
would not have substantially diminished the political influence on the rule setting process, 
given the nature of comitology and the ESC’s composition. 
From a theoretical perspective, these problems could be solved if two basic conditions 
were satisfied. Firstly, the co-decision procedure should always be limited to framework 
principles, in the narrow sense of core political principles including a broad delegation to 
implementing measures. This would be no doubt difficult to obtain in practice; yet, European 
institutions, politicians and interest groups should come to realize that reducing the scope of 
                                               
73 See, for similar comments, Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, Third Report monitoring the Lamfalussy 
Process, Brussels, 17 November 2004, 19. 
 
 29
level 1 legislation is the only practicable way to a consistent and effective EU securities 
regulation. Secondly, implementing rules should be adopted by an independent regulatory 
agency created at EU level (along lines which would not be manageable to analyse within the 
confines of the present paper), operating in lieu of the Commission and in co-operation with 
CESR. A similar body should comply with strict regulatory standards requiring, amongst 
others, that market failures be properly identified and rules justified as an appropriate 
reaction to similar failures. Compliance with these conditions should also assure that 
harmonisation is limited to cases where national regulators are unfit to deal with cross-border 
market failures. In the end, these two conditions respond to the core problems identified 
throughout this paper, such as the political interference with rule setting in highly technical 
areas and the excessive reach of EU securities regulation determined by political rather than 
economic considerations. Far from being a panacea, a European independent agency could 
help to build the EU securities regulation on sounder grounds in areas (like rules of conduct) 
clearly in need of harmonisation. In other areas, where the need for uniformity is not so 
apparent or regulatory competition is preferable, a similar agency could curb the 
development of further regulation if appropriate incentives were created in the law to this 
effect74. Moreover, mechanisms of consultation and political accountability could assure that 
the interests of market participants and investors are appropriately considered before taking 
regulatory action.  
 
 
                                               
74 For similar suggestions, see L. Zingales, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation’ (April 
2004) ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 21/2004, http://ssrn.com/abstract=536682, 54, proposing to create a new 
Government agency dedicated to estimate the costs and benefits of any new proposed regulation. 
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